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BRITISH AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGULATION OF
THE BRITISH BEER MARKET: TAPPING INTO THE TIED-
HOUSE SYSTEM (CHEERS!)
I. INTRODUCTION
Britain's tied-house system is a custom dating back to 1750 whereby
breweries both own the public houses (pubs) and either manage or
lease them.' In the course of its nearly 250 year history the British
pub has become a veritable institution in British life and tradition.
Virtually unique among denizens of beer drinking countries, Britons
drink most of their beer in pubs rather than at home. 2 In 1989, after
three years of inquiry, Britain's Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(MMC) published its report on the supply of beer in the United
Kingdom market.' Its findings of the existence of a complex monopoly
and proposals for a radical reform of the tied-house system provoked
howls of protest from traditionalists and brewery interests sufficient
to force the government to retreat and propose a compromise plan.
Longworth, British Pub System on the Rocks: Free-Market Plan Likely to
Shake up Brewery Industry, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 26, 1981, § 7, at 1, col. 2
[hereinafter Chicago Tribune].
2 Id.
MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, THE SUPPLY OF BEER: A REPORT ON
THE SUPPLY oF BEER FOR RETAIL SALE IN TE U.K. [hereinafter MMC REPORT]. The
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission was created in 1948 under the
Monopolies and Restrictive Practice (Inquiry and Control) Act. It was renamed the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission under the Fair Trading Act 1973. The Com-
mission may not initiate investigations on its own but must wait for a reference
from the Minister responsible for monopolies (Secretary of State for Trade) or from
the Director General of Fair Trading. The Commission is required to reach definite
conclusions as to the matters referred, is restricted to the terms of the reference,
and may offer recommendations to be taken by the Minister or the affected parties.
Individual members may amend dissents on one or more issues. Provided that the
Commission has concluded a monopoly exists and has specified adverse effects to
the public interest, and the report has been laid before Parliament, the Minister has
discretion to make such orders as he feels requisite to prevent or remedy the specified
public interest detriments. The Minister is not bound to the recommendations of
the Commission. However, the Minister's remedial powers are restricted to the powers
granted under schedule 8 of the Fair Trading Act. V. KoL-I, COMPETITION LAW
OF BlRTAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET (3d rev. ed. 1982).
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The European Community (EC) is currently conducting a similar
investigation on a European scale.
II. FACTS
The British tied-house system consists of a complex monopoly
dominated by the country's brewers.4 It is characterized by a system
of vertical integration that permeates every level of the beer trade,
from manufacturing to retail.5 Access to the market is thereby limited.
Although the tied-house system is not unique to Britain, the extent
of vertical integration is a prominent feature of the United Kingdom's
beer industry. 6 The majority of British brewing companies not only
brew beer but also import, wholesale, and retail the beverage.7 The
retail outlets consist of either on-licensed or off-licensed premises.
Off-licensed premises are those in which alcoholic beverages may be
sold but not consumed on the premises. On-licensed premises are
those in which alcoholic beverages may be consumed on the premises,
and consist of full on-licenses, primarily public houses, and restricted
on-licenses, such as restaurants and hotels. In 1986, an estimated 85
percent of all beer sales were made through on-licensed premises."
Some 61 percent of all beer was sold through full on-licenses (primarily
public houses) while 46 percent of all beer was sold through brewer-
owned public houses. 9 Thus, the public house constitutes a very
important element of the British beer market.
There are four types of relationships which exist between the brewer
and the retail outlet. These are the brewer managed house, the
tenanted house, the independent public house, and the tied house.'0
4 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 66.
' Id. at 2.
6 Approximately 62 percent of all beer sales are made through the tied-house
system in the United Kingdom compared to a maximum 40 percent in other Com-
munity countries with tied-house systems. The proportion of beer sales passing
through tied-houses in Community countries are: Luxembourg (40%), Belgium (35%),
West Germany (25%), France (10%), and the Netherlands (10%). The Financial
Times, Business Law Brief, June, 1990.
7Id.
a Id. at 10. The figures are based on the estimates supplied by the Brewers
Society.
' MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 39. The figures are based on the Brewers
Society's statistics.
,0 Id. at 6. The managed house is owned by the brewer and the licensee is a
brewer employee. The tenanted house is characterized by a tenancy agreement which
obliges the tenant to buy all his beer from the brewer landlord in return for various
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The British brewery industry is comprised of about 220 brewers."
The beer market is substantially dominated by the big six national
brewers, who alone account for 75 percent of the United Kingdom's
beer production, 74 percent of the brewer-owned retail outlets, and
86 percent of all loan ties.' 2
The monopoly of the brewers, and of the big six in particular, is
accentuated by their dominant position in the wholesale sector.'3 Since
most brewers are also wholesalers, the wholesale market is strongly
influenced by brewer ownership of licensed premises and loan agree-
ments.' 4 In addition, entry into the United Kingdom's beer market
is limited by the brewer's dominant position in the import sector in
which they hold a 70 percent share. 5 The brewers have further
reinforced their monopoly and limited the market entry for imports
by means of licensing agreements with foreign producers.'6
benefits. The benefits offered include training, technical and marketing support, and
catering advise. The tenant is formally independent, but in practice enjoys a very
close relationship with the brewer. The third and fourth types constitute the "free
trade" outlets, that is, outlets not owned by the brewer. The independent public
house is completely free of all ties to the brewer and is free to buy his beer from
any source. The loan-tied free house is characterized by an exclusive purchase
agreement which obligates the tenant to buy all his beer from the creditor brewer
in exchange for a loan offered on very favorable terms. Id. at 6-7.
1 Id. at 13. Sixty-one of the approximately 220 breweries belong to the Brewer's
Society and together account for over 99 percent of British beer production. Id.
The industry may be classified into several groups: the six national brewers with
their 75 percent monopoly share of the market; and the eleven regional brewers
together with the forty-one local brewers and three brewers without tied estates
(BWTEs). BWTEs are brewers that primarily brew beer for sale to other brewers
or wholesalers. Id. at 15. The remaining 160 other brewers together account for less
than 1 percent of British beer production. Id. at 2.
12 Id. The big six national brewers, with their respective number of retail outlets
and market share are: Bass: 7300 outlets and 22 percent market share; Allied-Lyons:
6600 outlets and 14 percent share; Grand Metropolitan: 6100 outlets and 12 percent
share; Whitbread: 6500 outlets; Scottish & Newcastle: 2300 outlets and 10 percent
share; Courage: 5000 outlets and 10 percent share. Parkes, Rundown on the Six
Top Players in the Brewery and Drinks Retailing Game, Financial Times (London),
July 12, 1989, § 1, at 6, col. 1 [hereinafter Financial Times, July 12].
,1 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 278. The brewers effectively control the
distribution and wholesaling of over 90 percent of beer in the United Kingdom.
" Id. at 22. The dominance of the national brewers in the on-license retail sector
inhibits the growth of a strong independent wholesale sector. Id. at 4.
" Id. at 10. By contrast, imports by independent wholesalers accounted for less
than 2 percent of the total beer market.
,6 Id. at 10, 12. Although foreign brands of lager represent 17 percent of British
consumption, much of this is brewed by British brewers under license in the United
Kingdom.
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In 1989 Britain's Monopolies and Mergers Commission found Bri-
tain's tied-house system to be against the public interest and called
for substantial reform.' 7 In 1986 the Office of Fair Trading asked
the MMC to investigate the supply of beer in the United Kingdom."8
The MMC report, published on March 21, 1989, found that a complex
monopoly existed within the United Kingdom's beer industry.' 9 The
report recommended: 1) that no brewer own more than 2000 licensed
outlets; 2) that tied tenants be permitted to sell "guest beers" and
buy beverages, other than beer, from the most competitive supplier; 2
3) that tied loans be eliminated; 4) that security of tenure be guar-
anteed for tenants; 2' and 5) that brewers be required to publish and
adhere to their wholesale price lists.22
Although the report received widespread support from non-brewing
quarters, on July 10, 1989, the British government succumbed to the
most intense lobbying and political campaign ever mounted against
a commission report.23 The government backed down from accepting
the report's recommendations in full and put forth a compromise
plan.2 The most important changes adopted in the compromise plan
are: 1).that brewers need not divest themselves of all outlets over
the 2000 ceiling but must maintain at least 50 percent of their outlets
over 2000 as free houses; 25 and 2) that the system of tied loans would
be retained but with the proviso that publicans of all free houses
would be able to obtain loan ties with easy exits from any brewer. 26
11 Wood, Chronology of the Dispute Over Tied Houses, Financial Times (London),
July 11, 1989, § 1, at 10, col. 3 [hereinafter Financial Times, July 11].
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Wood, Young's Brew Will Speed Changes: Lisa Wood on Reaction to Proposals
to Shake up British Pubs, Financial Times (London), July 11, 1989, § 1, at 10, col.
3 [hereinafter Young's Brew]. A guest beer is a draught beer that a tenant would
be permitted to buy from a supplier other than the landlord.
21 Id. Brewery tenants will henceforth be afforded the protection of the Landlord
and Tenant Act of 1954, giving them the same protection as other business tenants.
Statement by Trade and Industry Secretary Lord Young, Department of Trade and
Industry Press Notice (July 10, 1989) [hereinafter Young Statement].
2 Young's Brew, supra note 20, at 10.
" Id. The campaign consisted of lobbying by the brewing industry, the Transport
and General Workers Union (fearful of losing jobs), backbench Members of Parlia-
ment from the governing Conservative Party, and a £6 million advertising campaign.
24 Financial Times, July 11, supra note 17, at 10.
2 Id.
2 Id. The easy exit provision would require all loan times to be capable of
termination with a maximum three months notice without penalty; and in the case




The compromise plan will principally affect the big six national
brewers who will now have to keep an arms length relationship with
50 percent of their public houses above the 2,000 ceiling.2 7 The plan's
author, Trade and Industry Secretary Lord Young, estimates that
some 11,000 additional pubs will thereby be subjected to increased
competition.2 8
Although opposition to the plan continues to exist, there are in-
dications that the compromise plan will eventually be accepted by
the brewing industry. 29 Whether the compromise plan will be ac-
ceptable to the European Commission is another matter. In March
1989, Sir Leon Brittan, the European Competition Commissioner,
began an investigation of the tied-house system in all Community
countries except Denmark.3 0 In June 1989, EC officials indicated that
they expected the Commission's review of the beer industry to be
more far-reaching than that of the MMC. At the time of writing,
the Commission's review was continuing.3'
III. EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW
By its very nature, an agreement between a publican and a brewery
in which the publican is obliged to buy all his drinks from the brewery
restrains competition. 32 Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome prohibits
as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the pre-
27 Financial Times, July 11, supra note 17, at 10.
28 Id.
Financial Times, July 12, supra note 12, at 6.
- Financial Times, July 11, supra note 17, at 10.
11 Since this article was written, the European Commission's review of the EC
beer market has come to a completion and its conclusions were announced on June
14, 1990. The report appears to largely validate the premise and conclusion of this
article; that despite its faults, Britain's tied-house system is still largely deserving of
the block exemption granted under Regulation 1984/83 to exclusive purchase agree-
ments between breweries and their retail outlets, and that Britain's tied-house system
requires no radical overhaul in order to maintain a reasonably competitive beer
market. The European Commission, however, singled out the United Kingdom's
market for possible further review after the British government's reforms have been
fully implemented and have had time to take effect. The results of the European
Commission's review, together with other recent developments, are discussed in a
postscript to this article.
32 Sinan, Tied-House Agreements and the EEC Competition Rules: A Brief His-
tory, 135 NEw L. J. 1063 (1985) [hereinafter Sinan].
1990]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
vention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the common
market. 33
Such agreements are automatically void under Article 85(2) of the
Treaty. 34 However, since such agreements are not necessarily without
benefits an exemption may be granted under certain circumstances .3
Article 85(3) of the Treaty lays out the conditions necessary for an
agreement to be exempted from Article 85(1). Four conditions must
be satisfied, two positive and two negative. The agreement must:
a) contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods
or to promoting technical or economic progress; and
b) allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.
The agreement must not:
a) impose restrictions which are not indispensable to the achieve-
ment of these objectives; and
b) afford the possibility of eliminating competition in respect to
a substantial part of the products in question. 36
Benefit of Article 85(3) may be obtained either by an individual
exemption granted by the Commission after notification or through
an applicable block exemption. 7 The general rule is that unless an
applicable stock exemption is available, an exclusive dealing agreement
may not be enforceable unless individually notified to, and approved
by, the Commission .3  An agreement that contains restrictions ex-
ceeding those permitted under the block exemption may not benefit
from the exemption and will require individual notification to, and
approval by, the Commission. 39 The power to grant an exemption is
reserved exclusively for the Commission by virtue of Art. 9(1) of
" Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty).
14 Id. The entire agreement will not necessarily be void. If the offending parts
are severable, they alone will be voided. The issue of severability is a question of
national law. V. KonAn, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC ComPrTMoN LAW AND
PRACTICE 33 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter KoRAH].
" See infra note 78 for a summary of the benefits the Commission considers to
derive from exclusive beer purchase agreements.
36 EEC Treaty, supra note 33. For a concise but thorough explanation of the
requirements and treatment by the Commission of the four prerequisites for an
exemption under Article 85(3), see generally GLEISS, CoMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW
264-94 (3d Am. ed. 1981) [hereinafter GLEiSS].
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Regulation 17. 40 Pursuant to the authority granted by Regulation
19/65' the Commission has adopted regulations providing for block
exemptions for certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements.42
To obtain an exemption the Commission must be satisfied that the
advantages outweigh the disadvantages that may be posed to com-
petition.43 Among the advantages considered most important by the
Commission are cost savings," broader offers, 5 opening markets,"
and the creation and preservation of jobs.4 7 The most important
disadvantages considered by the Commission are the creation of
watertight markets" and the exclusion of competitors. 49
Not until 1962 when the Council of Ministers adopted the first
implementing regulation (number 17)50 was there any real attempt to
- OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CommJNIms, EEC COM-
PETITION POLICY IN THE SINGLE MARKET 12 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter EEC Com-
PETITION POLICY].
" 36 J.O. Com. EUR. 533 (1965) [hereinafter Council Resolution 19/65]. Council
Resolution 19/65 also authorizes the Commission to issue block exemptions under
Article 85(3) for licensing agreements.
42 Block exemptions have been adopted covering the following types of agreements:
patents, licensing, research and development, franchising, know-how licensing, spe-
cialization, and distribution agreements in the auto sector. EEC ComPET mrON POLICY,
supra note 40, at 19. See also GOYDER, infra note 153, at 113, for a list of block
exemption regulations.
43 KERsE, supra note 37, at 11.
- GLEiss, supra note 36, at 272. The Commission has always considered cost
savings to be a sufficient advantage within the meaning of Article 85(3). The cost
savings, however, must be substantially equal to or greater than the disadvantages
of the restrictions.
4 Id. at 273-74. Encompassed within the concept of broader offers are factors
such as increasing the range of products, improving product quality, increasing the
number of outlets, promoting research and development, and broadening the firm's
activities. The Commission considers broader offers to be as important as cost
savings.
- Id. Opening markets is essentially a sub-set of broader offers and is considered
to be particularly significant by the Commission.
47 Id. at 275. Although the Commission has been largely silent concerning the
importance of the creation and preservation of jobs as a factor, it may be argued
that job creation and preservation is a significant factor because it contributes to
the improvement of the national economy and the promotion of economic progress
within the meaning of Article 85(3).
48 Id. at 279.The Commission always looks negatively upon agreements that do
or may result in the partitioning of national markets. The partitioning of national
markets can never be outweighed by the advantages of an agreement.
49 Id. at 280. An agreement that creates a division of markets by excluding
competitors cannot qualify for an exemption even if it does not partition off markets
because it does not contribute to economic progress but, on the contrary, interferes
with it.
" 10 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 57) 849 (1967).
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enforce the competition rules.5 Regulation 17 confirmed the basic
prohibitions of Articles 85 and 86 and provided for negative clear-
ances,52 orders to terminate an infringement, 3 a system of notifica-
tions, requests for information, the power to grant exemptions and
comfort letters,54 inspections, hearings, confidentiality, and the im-
position of fines and penalties. 5
The avalanche of notifications of agreements that engulfed the
Commission necessitated that a simplified and efficient mechanism
be devised to handle the workload. 56 Consequently, in order to avoid
the overbearing workload, the Council of Ministers granted the Eur-
opean Commission the authority to issue block exemption regulations
for categories of exclusive dealing agreements.5 7 Pursuant to this
authority, the Commission adopted regulation 67/67 which provided
a block exemption for exclusive dealing agreements. Since then, the
Commission has adopted regulations providing block exemptions for
certain other categories of agreements.5" Regulation 67/67 failed to
draw a distinction between exclusive distribution and exclusive pur-'
chase agreements and contained no special provisions for beer supply
agreements. It provided that the regulation did "not apply to agree-
ments to which undertakings from one Member State only are a
party and which concern the resale of goods within that Member
State." 5 9
Prior to 1977, the Commission's practice was based on a strict
interpretation of Regulation 67/67 which held that purely national
tying agreements did not violate Article 85(1) of the Treaty. 6 It was
51 KoRAH, supra note 34, at 34.
52 Id. at 34-35. A negative clearance is not an exemption but a statement by the
Commission that, based on known facts, the agreement poses no problems under
Articles 85 or 86. The negative clearance is not binding on national courts or the
European Court of Justice and may be withdrawn should new circumstances arise.
51 Id. at 38. An order to terminate an infringement is the main way in which
the Commission enforces the competition rules.
5, KERSE, supra note 37, at 73. A substantial number of cases are dealt with by
comfort letters. These are statements issued by the Commission following a prelim-
inary examination declaring that the agreement poses no problems to the- competition
rules and stating its intention to close the file on the case. The Commission may
reserve the right to reopen the file for reconsideration.
5 10 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 57) 849 (1967).
56 Ko AH, supra note 34, at 73. Soon after the adoption of Regulation 67/67,
the Commission was inundated with about 30,000 notifications of distribution agree-
ments.
57 Id.
11 Council Resolution 19/65, supra note 41.
59 Regulation 67/67, 10 O.J. EUR. CozM. (No. L 57) 849 (1967), at art. 1(2).
60 European Parliamentary Question No. 1764/82, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
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only in that year that the European Court of Justice (the Court) held
in Alexis and Martine De Norre v. NV Brouwerij Concordia that
notwithstanding the language of Regulation 67/67, an exclusive pur-
chase agreement restricted to undertakings and activities within a
single Member State could fall under Article 85(1) if the cumulative
effects were such as to restrict trade between the Member States and
did not otherwise qualify for an exemption under Article 85(3).61
The Court had previously held, in Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin
and Wilkin, that to determine whether an exclusive purchase agree-
ment falls under the sanctions of Article 85(l), the existence of similar
contracts was a factor that had to be considered.6 2 Thus, the cu-
mulative effects of similar agreements on trade between Member States
should be considered rather than the agreement in isolation. 6
Regulation 67/67 was considered inadequate because it contained
no specific exclusive purchase agreement provision and because it was
aimed primarily at cross-border distribution." Recognizing the in-
adequacies of Regulation 67/67, the European Commission conse-
quently adopted Regulations 1983/8365 and 1984/83 which provided
93) 22, 23 (1983) [hereinafter Question No. 1764/82] (Response by Mr. Adriessen
on behalf of the European Commission).
61 Alexis and Martine de Norre v. NV Braunwerij Concordia, 1977 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 65, 97, [19771 19 CoMM. MKT. L.R. 378, 406. Concordia, a Belgian
brewery, brought suit against the defendants, successors to an exclusive beer purchase
of a cafe in Gwent, Belgium, for failure to abide by the agreement. In response to
a series of questions referred to it for a preliminary ruling by the Belgian court
concerning the interpretation of Article 85 of the Treaty, Council Regulation No.
17, and Commission Regulation No. 67/67, the European Court held that exclusive
purchase agreements, in which two undertakings from one Member State only, which
do not possess the prohibited features of Regulation 67/67, may qualify for the
block exemption of that regulation if, failing exemption, they would otherwise fall
within the prohibition of Article 85(l) of the Treaty.
62 S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin and Wilkin, 1967 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
407, 416, [1968] 7 Comm. MKT. L.R. 26, 41. The de Haecht brewery, a Belgian
company, brought suit before the Tribunal de Commerce de Liege against Wilkins,
proprieties of a cafe in Eshaux, Belgium, for violation of an exclusive liquor purchase
agreement. In answer to the question referred to it for a preliminary ruling under
Article 177 of the Treaty, the European Court held that exclusive purchase agreements
are not by their nature violative of Article 85(l). However, they may violate Article
85(1) if, taken either in isolation or together with others, and considered within the
economic or legal context in which they are made, they may affect community trade
or they have as their objective or effect the restriction, distortion, or prevention of
trade. Id. at 1967 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 416, 7 Comm. MKT. L.R. at 41.
63 Concordia, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 97, 19 CoMM. MKT. L.R. at 402,
404.
" Question No. 1764/82, supra note 60, at 23.
65 Regulation 1983/83, 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 173) 1 (1983). The provisions
of Regulation 1983/83 largely parallel the provisions of Regulation 1984/83.
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block exemptions for certain exclusive distribution and exclusive pur-
chase agreements. 6 Title II of Regulation 1984/83 contains special
provisions for beer supply agreements. 67 Under Article 6 of Regulation
1984/83, Article 85(1) is held not to apply to agreements between
two enterprises (a pub and a brewery) for the exclusive purchase and
sale of certain beers, or certain beers and drinks specified in the
agreement."
Article 7 of Regulation 1984/83 lists the other permitted restric-
tions. The supplier may restrict the reseller from selling beers and
drinks of the same type as those specified in the agreement so long
as he is able to supply such drinks. The reseller may be obliged to
sell those beers obtained from other suppliers that are of a different
type than those provided by the supplier only in bottles, cans, or
packages unless they are customarily sold in draught form or there
is sufficient customer demand.70
Article 8 of the Regulation lists certain situations where the ex-
emption will not apply. 71 Products other than drinks or services may
not be included in the tie. The reseller's right to obtain non-exclusive
goods or services may not be restricted; nor may the reseller be
obliged to bind his successor to the agreement for a longer period
than he himself would be bound. A total tie may not exceed five
years and a partial tie no more than ten years.7 2 However, where the
supplier is also the landlord, the agreement may last for as long as
the reseller occupies the premises. Furthermore, where the supplier
is the landlord, the reseller must be permitted to obtain drinks besides
beer from others if their terms are more favorable than those of the
66 Regulation 1984/83, 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 173) 5 (1983) [hereinafter
Regulation 1984/83). This Regulation superceded Regulation 67/67, whose transi-
tional arrangements expired on January 1, 1989. All agreements previously in com-
pliance with Regulation 67/67 must have been brought in line with Regulation 1984/
83 by 1989 to retain their validity. Regulation 1984/83 expires on December 31,
1997. Sinan, supra note 32, at 1063.
67 Articles 1-5 of Title I contain the general provisions. Articles 6-9 of Title II
contain the special provisions for beer supply agreements. Articles 10-13 of Title III
contain special provisions for service-station agreements. Articles 14-19 of Title IV
contain miscellaneous provisions.
Regulation 1984/83, supra note 66, at 9.
69 Id. This list of restrictions is exhaustive. Sinan, supra note 32, at 1064.
70 Regulation 1984/83, supra note 66, at 9.
71 Id.
72 Id. A total tie is an exclusive purchase agreement covering specific beers and




supplier or if the supplier does not offer such drinks at all.73 Since
these situations would extend the tie beyond the supply of beer, the
exemption does not apply.
Finally, Article 14 of Regulation 1984/83 permits the Commission
to withdraw the block exemption whenever it finds the agreement
incompatible with Article 85(3).of the Treaty, and particulary where:
a) the contract goods are not subject to effective competition from
identical or equivalent goods; b) access by other suppliers becomes
significantly more difficult; or c) the supplier unjustifiably refuses to
supply categories of resellers who cannot obtain the goods elsewhere
on suitable terms or applies different prices or conditions to them,
or applies less favorable conditions to tied resellers. 74
The terms of the Treaty of Rome and the regulations issued pur-
suant to them are directly applicable and binding upon Member
States." In cases of conflict with national law, Community law pre-
vails. 76 The proposed reforms to the tied-house system must, therefore,
comply with Community law.
IV. ANALYSIS
Article 85(3) of the Treaty and Regulation 1984/83 implicitly assume
the inherent anti-competitive nature of the tied-house system, but
nonetheless grant a block exemption for beer supply agreements on
the premise that there are also benefits to be derived from the system.77
Compliance will therefore be largely determined by balancing the
detriments to free competition caused by the system against the
benefits derived therefrom.78
71 Regulation 1984/83, supra note 66, at 9.
7 Id. at 10, 11.
7 EEC COMPETrrION POLICY, supra note 40, at 11.
76 Id. at 12.
" See EEC Treaty, supra note 33; Regulation 1984/83, supra note 66.
71 In adopting Regulation 1984/83, the Commission considered the benefits that
would accrue to suppliers, resellers, and consumers as sufficient justification for a
special block exemption for brewery tying agreements.
The Commission believed that tying agreements would permit suppliers to make
long-term planning of sales, encourage cost effective organization of production and
distribution, and produce lower distribution costs as a result of the reduced risk of
variations in market conditions. In addition, it was believed that tying agreements
were often the most effective, and sometimes the only way, for producers to penetrate
a market, especially for small and medium sized firms.
The benefits that were deemed to accrue to the resellers were considered to come
primarily in the form of commercial and financial advantages conferred by the
19901
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
A. The MMC and Young Plans Compared
The MMC concluded that the monopoly had enabled the brewers
with tied estates to restrict the growth of brewers without tied estates
(BWTEs) and independent wholesalers of cider and soft drinks, to
keep tenants in an inferior bargaining position, and to prevent the
emergence of a strong independent retail sector.79 In particular, it
found the main public policy detriments resulting from the monopoly
to be: a) higher than expected beer prices; b) excessive wholesale
price variations between regions; c) restricted consumer choices in
beer and drinks; d) inability of tenants to participate fully in meeting
customer preferences due to the tie and tenants' inferior bargaining
position; and e) limited access to the on-license market by independent
manufacturers and wholesalers of beer.8 0 The MMC believed that
since growth in the number of full on-licenses was unlikely in view
of the operation of the licensing system, structural changes were
required to increase competition in order to remedy the public det-
riments."'
Lord Young essentially accepted the MMC's conclusions but dif-
fered on some of the recommendations. Lord Young suggested changes
in the two main planks of the recommendations, the enforced di-
vestment by the big six of all outlets owned above 2000 and the total
elimination of loan ties. 2 First, rather than force divestment, the
compromise plan would permit continued ownership but would re-
quire the six national brewers to keep at least 50 percent of their
pubs above the 2000 ceiling as free houses. 3 Second, rather than
eliminate all loan ties, Lord Young's compromise plan would permit
their continuation but would now enable all publicans to obtain loan
breweries which would enable the publicans to establish, modernize, operate and
maintain their premises. Cooperation between the parties was expected to permit
the publican to maintain or improve the quality of goods and services to customers.
The consumer was presumed to benefit from all this by the guarantee of an
ensured supply of quality beer at fair prices, and a choice between the products of
different producers. Regulation 1984/83, supra note 66, at 5-6.
79 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Financial Times, July 11, supra note 17, at 22.
11 Id. The divestment provision would only have affected the six national brewers
since they alone own more than 2000 on-license premises. MMC REPORT, supra note
3, at 5. This proposed change was originally put forward by the Brewer's Society.
Financial Times, July 11, supra note 17, at 10.
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ties with easy exits from any brewer.84 In addition, although the
MMC made no such recommendation, Lord Young proposed a review
of the licensing system's role in limiting access to the full on-licensed
market.85
The principal difference in the effect that arises between the com-
promise plan and the MMC recommendations is essentially two-fold.
The first relates to ownership. Under the MMC plan, the brewers
would be restricted to 2000 on-licenses which would require the
divestment of 22,000 outlets . 6 The compromise plan, however, could
not only reduce brewer ownership but could, theoretically, permit an
increase in brewer ownership.8 7
The practical result of this difference in ownership will largely be
determined by the second principal difference between the Young and
MMC recommendations: the elimination of loan ties. The MMC
ownership restriction, coupled with the recommended elimination of
all loan ties, would presumably result in the creation of an additional
22,000 independent free houses, thus more than doubling the number
of independent free houses in existence. 8 This should significantly
increase competition by creating a strong, independent free house
sector in opposition to the tied-house sector.
The compromise plan should likewise result in an appreciable in-
crease in the free house sector, but with a significant difference. The
proposed continued existence of tied loans, albeit with significantly
less stringent conditions, should result in an additional 11,030 free
houses. 9 Thus, this portion of the Young plan will not result in a
significant increase in the number of independent free houses, but
will increase the number of tied free houses. This part of the com-
promise plan will likely enhance competition, especially in the non-
beer sector which will be completely freed from loan ties. However,
it will do little to aid in the creation of a strong independent free
84 Financial Times, July 11, supra note 17, at 10. The easy exit provision would
require all loan ties to be capable of termination with a maximum of three months
notice without penalty, and in the case of national brewers, loans must be confined
to beer. Young Statement, supra note 21.
11 Young Statement, supra note 21.
86 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
87 Any increase in brewer ownership under the compromise plan, especially by
the nationals, is likely to be determined by the outcome of the proposed review of
the licensing system.
11 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 5. There are presently 15,000 free houses.
Young Statement, supra note 21.
89 Young Statement, supra note 21.
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house sector which would most effectively maximize competition.
In addition to the two principal changes, the Young plan differs
in that it would apply the MMC's guest beer recommendation only
to the national brewers rather than to all brewers, and thus result
in increased competitiveness for smaller breweries. 9° This modification
is altogether appropriate considering the overwhelming dominance of
the big six. Indeed, the beer market has recently become even more
concentrated as large brewers have taken over smaller ones. 9l Since
it is the small brewers that likely will be the chief beneficiaries of
this change, it is an appropriate means of bolstering competition."
The significance of this recent concentration by the large brewers
should not be overstated and should be considered in the context of
the trend towards retail outlets with restricted on-licenses (e.g. res-
taurants, hotels, clubs, etc.) and off-licenses. 93 The result has been
a general reduction in the brewer's share of all liquor licenses from
48 percent in 1967 to 26 percent in 1986. 94 Even in the absence of
reform, this trend will likely continue reducing the brewer's market
share in the future. The trend will probably accelerate under both
plans. In this respect, the MMC recommendations would have the
greatest effect, at least in the short term, by virtue of the divestment
recommendation since it would quickly add an additional 22,000
independent competitors to the market.
The purpose of the guest beer provision is to increase the consumer's
choice in beers by providing him the choice between a competitor's
brand and the landlord brewer's brands. In reality, the consumer's
9DId.
91 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. Since 1967, the big six have increased their
market share from 68 percent to 75 percent. Id.
It is recognized that it is not necessarily inevitable that the small breweries will
be the chief beneficiaries. While the tied-houses of the national brewers can be
required to offer a guest beer, the consumer cannot be forced to consume it and
small brewer's guest beers may fail to achieve a substantial market share. It is
possible that tied-house tenants will decide to switch to a nationally advertised and
known brand-name beer of a large brewer in order to increase sales. The Daily
Telegraph, Oct. 24, 1990, at 35, col. I. However, the self-interest of the large brewers
would act as a disincentive to switch to a nationally known brand-name since it is
unlikely that they would want to promote the sales of a major competitor.
9I Id. at 39.
94 Britain's Pubs Are Tops for Choice, Price, and Value for Money, Origin
Universal News Services Limited, Jan. 25, 1989 [hereinafter Origin Universal News
Service]. The brewers' share of full on-licenses has dropped from 78 percent to 57
percent, and that of the nationals to 42 percent. The brewers' share of off-licenses
has shrunk to 8 percent and that of the nationals to 7 percent.
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choice is unlikely to be much affected by this provision. The national
brewers already offer such a large variety of beers, ranging from
various bitters, ales, and lagers to import brands, that the addition
of one guest beer will have little practical consequence.9 5 The pro-
vision, if applied to all brewers as proposed by the MMC, rather
than to just the national brewers as proposed by Lord Young, would
primarily affect small local brewers with a limited range of beers.
Thus, in light of the overwhelming market dominance of the nationals,
the effect on most consumers' choice will be negligible at best.9
Though the MMC Report was critical of the licensing system, it
made no recommendations concerning its reform. 97 The licensing
system has generally worked to limit entry into the all-important full
on-license sector. 98 The Young plan recognizes and addresses this
problem by proposing a review of the licensing system. 9 Depending
on the extent of reforms produced by the review, the changes in the
licensing system could, like the MMC plan, produce significant im-
provement in the overall competitiveness of the market and would
strengthen the independent free house sector.
Although it may be concluded that the tied-house system does
indeed impose certain restrictions on competition, it may nonetheless
be argued that it falls within the exemption provisions of Article
85(3) and Regulation 1984/83.
9 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 460. A list of the beer brands carried by the
national brewers shows the extent of the range of beers. Each of the big six carries
at least fifty different brands representing various types of beer such as stouts, light
and pale ales, bitters and lagers. Id. Indeed, according to a report published by the
Brewer's Society, Leading Leisure in Britain, the choice of beer brands is greater
than in any other country except West Germany. The choice of beers in the typical
British pub, normally offering more than 16 draught and bottled beers, is, according
to the report, more than double that offered in any other country in Europe. Origin
Universal News Services, supra note 94.
In fact, there appears to be little consumer dissatisfaction with the choice of
beers available at public houses. See infra note 130.
97 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
Local licensing boards generally require not only that the licensee applicant
show his fitness but also that there is a demonstrable need for a new public house.
Young Statement, supra note 21. This latter requirement can be difficult to meet,
especially for a conventional public house, and the issuance of new licenses has
consequently been limited. MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. For example, whereas
restricted on-licenses have increased from 7000 in 1966 to 28,000 in 1986 and off-
licenses from 30,000 to 50,000, full on-licenses have increased only 7 percent between
1966-86. Id. at 1-2.
Young Statement, supra note 21.
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B. Comparisons With Foreign Markets
An examination of certain foreign beer markets may be instructive
for the purposes of determining the degree of competition existing
in the United Kingdom's market and the possible consequences that
might arise from implementation of the MMC or Young recommen-
dations.
Of the nine countries examined by the MMC, tying agreements
between brewers and licensed retail outlets are permitted in West
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Spain. They
are prohibited, however, in the United States, Canada, and Aus-
tralia.' °° For the sake of analysis, these countries may generally be
divided into three categories: 1) countries in which tying agreements
are prohibited;'0 ' 2) countries wherein significant ownership of outlets
and/or tying agreements are prevalent; 10 2 and 3) countries wherein
ownership of outlets and tying agreements are rare.0 3 Among the
European countries, ownership of outlets are -common only in the
United Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, while
tying agreements are rare in France and Spain but prevalent in one
form or another in the others.' 4 Despite the differences, several
important observations may be noted.
First, substantial market concentration exists in all categories. In
all countries, except West Germany, irrespective of the existence of
or the pervasiveness of tying agreements in whatever form, the beer
market is substantially monopolized by very few brewers.'0 5 At 75
percent, the market share of the big six British brewers is comparable
with that existing in other countries, and substantially less concen-
trated than in category one countries where ties are prohibited.
,00 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, app. 2-2 at 311-27.
10, Id. Exclusive tying agreements are prohibited in Australia, Canada, and the
United States. The latter two also prohibit the ownership of retail outlets.
102 Category two countries include West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Italy. Brewer ownership of outlets is rare in Italy. Id.
,03 Brewer ownership and ties are rare in Spain and France. Id.
104 Id.
205 The respective market shares of the dominant brewers for each country are as
follows: A. Category one countries: 1) United States: big three equals 73.7 percent,
big six equals 94 percent; 2) Canada: big six equals 96 percent; 3) Australia: big
two equals over 90 percent. B. Category two countries: 1) Italy: big three equals
65 percent; 2) West Germany: big five equals 28 percent; 3) Belgium: big two equals
70 percent; 4) Netherlands: big one equals 53 percent. C. Category three countries:
1) France: big two equals 73 percent, big three equals 81 percent; 2) Spain: big six
equals 76 percent. Id.
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An important contributing factor in the international trend towards
market concentration is the acquisition of and mergers between brew-
ers. Moreover, these mergers have often taken place between market
leaders. I 06 A more stringent application of the merger laws might be
an equally effective and less radical method of fostering competition
and preventing market concentration than the MMC approach. 0 7 In
this respect, the MMC's recent decision to reject the bid by Australia's
Elders IXL, which already owns Britain's sixth-largest brewer, Cour-
age Holdings, to acquire Britain's fifth-largest brewer, Scottish &
Newcastle, was a positive and encouraging sign. 0 8
Second, foreign penetration of home markets is minimal in all but
two countries. At 11 percent and 16.3 percent respectively, only France
and Italy have an import penetration rate higher than the United
Kingdom's 5.4 percent. 109 These two factors, taken together, suggest
In 1988, Belgium's two largest brewers merged to form Belbrew while the third
and fourth-largest brewers merged to form the Maes Kronenbourg Group. The two
had a combined 70 percent market share. Id. at 312. Similarly, in Italy mergers
have recently been concluded between the largest and third-largest brewers and
between the second and fourth-largest brewers. The two merged firms hold a com-
bined 59 percent market share. Id. at 323. In like fashion, Britain's largest brewers
have also grown by mergers and acquisitions. Id. at 3.
101 In this respect, it should be noted that the concerns about national market
concentrations are becoming increasingly less relevant in light of the imminence of
1992 and the creation of an effective single European market. As this process
develops, the relevant geographic market for the purposes of competition law will
increasingly be evaluated on a Community-wide scale; today's national markets will
be tomorrow's regional or local market. Regulation 4064/89, 32 O.J. EUR. Co.
(No. L 395) (1989) concerning the control of concentrations between undertakings,
was passed on December 21, 1989, and prohibits the creation of a monopoly by
merger and acquisition. The regulation is an important new development in Com-
munity competition law since under Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome only the abuse
of and not the creation of a monopoly is forbidden by Community competition
law. An important limitation is that the regulation applies only to the merged firms
that will together have a combined world-wide turnover of five billion ECU or 250
million ECU in Community-wide turnover. Id. at art. 1(2).
101 N.Y. Times, March 22, 1989, at 22, col. 5. The combined group, with a 21
percent market share, would have created the second-largest brewer behind Bass,
which has a 25 percent market share.
109 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 312. It should be noted that Italy and France
share the lowest per capita beer consumption rate, whereas among the countries
with a reasonably high per capita consumption rate, only the United States, at 4.7
percent, has an import penetration rate that approaches the 5.4 percent import share
existing in the United Kingdom. By contrast, in West Germany, which has the highest
per capita consumption rate, imports account for only I percent of beer consumption.
Id. at 311-12. Only approximately 4 percent of all beer consumed in the Community
has crossed a national boundary. Only three European brewers, BSN (France),
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that the tied-house system as it exists in Britain today is not the
dispositive factor in partitioning the United Kingdom market from
foreign competition." 0
Foreign brewers have long chafed at the problems of penetrating
Britain's beer market."' Presently, most foreign beers are brewed in
the United Kingdom under license agreements by the big six.112 Under
the MMC proposals the large brewers are left with four options: 1)
to maintain their present structure, albeit at a much reduced level;
2) to divest themselves of their breweries and retain their public
houses; 3) to divest themselves of their licensed retailing outlets and
to concentrate their operations on manufacturing; and 4) to split
their operations into separate retailing and manufacturing entities." 3
The option chosen will depend on whether the brewer makes most
of its money from brewing or retailing.
It is widely believed that the chief beneficiaries of any break-up
of the tied-house system would be foreign brewers." 4 Some would
be expected to buy the breweries divested by British brewers electing
to concentrate on retailing while others might be expected to buy the
divested pubs from British brewers electing to concentrate on brewing." 5
Although the smaller British brewers could also buy the divested
properties, it is believed that most would be purchased by foreign
brewers, probably due to their greater financial resources." 6
Heineken (Netherlands), and Carlsberg (Denmark) are present in most of the Com-
munity countries and even these have only a minor presence outside their home
markets. EC Commission Ponders Recommendations on Licensing Arrangements by
Brewers, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1472, at 1024 (June 28, 1990).
10 It is conceivable that other factors peculiar to the national market such as
local taste, customs, traditions, and self-reinforcing social habits more readily explain
the substantial preference for domestic beers that is apparent, as indicated by the
import penetration figures, in almost all the surveyed countries. See MMC REPORT,
supra note 3, at 311-27.
- Chicago Tribune, supra note 1, § 7, at 1, col. 2.
112 Id. For instance, Grand Metropolitan brews Budweiser and Whitbread brews
Heineken under license.
13 It is widely believed that Allied, Grand Metropolitan, and Whitbread would
be most likely to take the second option and concentrate on retailing. Courage is
expected to take the third option and concentrate on brewing, while Britain's largest
brewer is expected to take option four and split into two. Id. The recent restructuring
plan announced by Bass aimed at separating its retailing and brewing operations
into separate divisions was widely interpreted as supporting this view. The Daily
Telegraph, June 24, 1989, at 19, col. 1.
"4 Chicago Tribune, supra note 1, § 7, at 1, col. 2.
-1 The Daily Telegraph, March 23, 1989, at 29.
116 Chicago Tribune, supra note 1, § 7, at 1, col. 2.
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Under this scenario, it has been argued that the probable result
would be an increasingly concentrated beer market." 7 The few re-
maining national brewers, together with the invading foreign brewers,
would grow without restraint to monopolize the beer market, while
those companies choosing to concentrate on the retail end would
grow to monopolize the pub trade."" However, it should be noted
that the MMC is not without power under national law to restrict
the growth of the brewers by mergers and acquisitions. Until De-
cember 1989, the European Commission was largely impotent to
prevent the acquisition of a monopoly, since Article 86 prohibited
only the abuse of, and not the acquisition of, a dominant position." 9
It is unclear how effective Regulation 4064/89 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings will be in this situation since its
prohibition against the acquisition of market domination by mergers
or acquisitions is restricted to very large firms that have a certain
high turnover. 20
Third, the average price of beer in Britain is not expensive by
continental standards. In a survey, the average price of a pint of
beer in the United Kingdom was found to be substantially less than
the price paid in selected European countries and required less work-
time from the British worker than his European counterpart.' 2'
Finally, the total number of beer brands, in both draught and
packaged form, far surpasses the number offered in other European
countries.122 Furthermore, Ireland excepted, the average number of
beer brands offered in British public houses exceeds those offered in
comparable European bars. 23 The average British public house offers
about six draught beers of various types.'2 Divestment would be
unlikely to increase the product mix of draught beer offered beyond
that which the guest beer proposal would accomplish because of the
physical constraints imposed by the structure of the average public
house. 2
- The Sunday Telegraph, March 26, 1989, at 35.
Its Id.
"9 EEC Treaty, supra note 33, at art. 81.
- Regulation 4064/89, supra note 107, at art. 1(2).
121 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 440-41. The countries surveyed were West
Germany, France, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.
2 Id. at 439, table 12.
,23 Id. at 439, table 10.
,2 Id. at 299.
i2 Id. at 299 (dissenting view of L.A. Mills).
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The real issue concerning consumer choice, however, is not the
choice of beer types but the choice of beer brands. Intuitively, the
MMC proposals of forced divestment and the abolition of all loan
ties would have a greater effect on brand competition than the Young
plan. However, it is far from certain that the MMC proposals would
result in a substantial increase in the selection of beer brands offered
in the average British public house, for there are compelling business
and physical constraints on the number of brands any public house
is likely to be able to stock. 26
In addition to the above, other factors bear upon consumer choice.
First, even in the absence of tying agreements and brewer ownership
of public houses, it is uncertain that consumer choice would expand.
Independent publicans would probably continue to sell the most
highly-profitable and highly-advertised brands.2 7 Under these circum-
stances, the national brewers, due to advantages in economies of
scale and overwhelming financial strength, can be expected to dom-
inate the market. The nearly universal trend towards market con-
centration by a few manufacturers in each country supports this
conclusion. 2 Furthermore, only minimal differences exist between
managed, tenanted, and independent free houses in the number of
brands offered. Although independent free houses offer a somewhat
wider choice of draught beer, managed and tenanted houses offer a
wider selection of bottled beers. 29 In any event, most consumers find
little difficulty getting whatever beer they want in public houses.3 0
Second, the degree of competition is more likely to be affected by
the location of one pub relative to another than by any other factor. 3'
Consumers will frequently have a choice between competing managed,
11 It is highly improbable that more than a very few public houses would have
the financial and physical resources to stock anything near the more than four
hundred beer brands currently available from the brewers. MMC REPORT, supra
note 3, at 299. It is instructive that independent public houses, possessing complete
freedom to sell as many brands from whatever available source, on average sell no
more than the average number of brands sold in managed or tenanted houses. Id.
at 60.
127 Id. at 299 (dissenting view of L.A. Mills).
I's See supra note 103.
129 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 60.
130 Id. at 51. A survey conducted by the Consumer's Association revealed that
choice of beer brands in public houses were of little concern to the British public.
Only 6 percent mentioned availability of beer brands as a reason for choosing a





tenanted, or independent public houses in their neighborhoods. 13 2
Where one brewer has a monopoly of public houses in any given
locality, a less radical and equally effective solution would be to
reform the licensing system so as to require proof of diversity before
the issuance or renewal of licenses.
Currently, some 75 percent of all public houses are owned by
brewers while half of the remainder are tied to them by loans.13a
While growth in the restricted on-license and off-license market has
been robust over the years, the growth of on-licenses has been anemic. 3 4
Since public houses require full on-licenses, their growth has been
minimal.' Consequently, entry into the pub trade by opening a new
public house is difficult. Since the brewers own or control most public
houses, the scarcity and difficulty of obtaining new full on-licenses
is tantamount to a de facto conspiracy between the licensing boards
and the brewers to perpetuate the brewer's stranglehold on the pub
trade.
Various solutions short of the sledgehammer approach of the MMC
are conceivable. Consumers will frequently have a choice between
competing managed, tenanted, tied, or independent public houses in
the neighborhood. Licensing authorities might prohibit the transfer
of licenses upon sale of a public house to another brewer that already
owns the maximum permitted number of pubs, and permit the transfer
only upon a strong showing that there are no willing buyers of a
preferred class. Alternatively, the authorities might institute a blanket
ban on the issuance of new licenses to brewers that have reached a
given threshold of pub ownership, subject to strictly circumscribed
exceptions. Another possible solution would be to rely on natural
attrition. The number of independent public houses could be increased
by the natural attrition of the market combined with a competition-
oriented licensing policy. For instance, Grand Metropolitan alone has
1 Id. The great majority of on-licenses (90 percent) have another on-licensed
outlet within five minutes walk, and 34 percent have at least ten nearby outlets.
" Id. at 2.
'1 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. The percentage of full on-licenses to restrictive
on-licenses has declined significantly over the years. In the period 1966-1986 there
was an overall 40 percent increase in licensed premises. Growth has been uneven.
The restricted on-license sector (e.g. restaurants) grew by 400 percent, off-licenses
grew by two-thirds, and licenses issued to clubs by 30 percent. But in the same
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recently disposed of more than 700 public houses. 3 6 In any event,
the licensing authorities should give strong preference to applications
for new licenses from entrepreneurs, independents, and small local
brewers.
Third, most brewers exchange beers with each other. 3 7 This is
especially true of bottled beers, both domestic and foreign, where
consumer choice is both varied and extensive. 38 This practice goes
some way to offset the restrictive effects of exclusive tying agreements
on consumer choice.
The recent experience of Australia, which has abolished the beer
tie, holds special significance. It may be an indication of the possible
consequences of the abolition or radical alteration of the tied-house
system. In less than ten years following the abolition of the beer tie,
two brewers, Elders and Bond, had acquired over 90 percent of the
Australian beer market. 39 The proportion of beer sold by public
houses plummeted from 75 percent to 35 percent of sales as pubs
closed and off-license sales increased dramatically.'1 Between 1974
and 1986, wholesale and retail prices of draught beer rose 70 percent
and 30 percent in real terms.' 4' Far from increasing competition and
providing greater consumer choice and value for money (the major
concerns of the MMC), the reforms resulted in fewer public houses,
higher prices, less consumer choice, and less competition!
In summary, in the major areas of concern to the MMC- com-
petition between brewers, consumer choice and prices-the compar-
ison with other countries generally favors the competition system of
the United Kingdom. Prices are typically cheaper, the consumer's
choice more extensive, import penetration greater, and market con-
centration less than in most comparable countries. This conclusion
is buttressed by the perception of British and foreign consumers who
generally consider British public houses to offer greater consumer
"a Id. at 272. There is some discrepancy here. The MMC REPORT covers the
period of its inquiry (1986-1989). The Chicago Tribune, supra note 1, § 7, at 1,
col. 2, however, reported that Grand Metropolitan sold over 800 outlets in the last
year alone. In any event, a very substantial number of pubs change hands each
year.
"I MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 275.
138 Id.
I" The Sunday Telegraph, March 26, 1989, at 35.
140 Id.
141 Id. By contrast, in Britain, retail pub prices rose 20 percent between 1973 and
1987, and draught beer rose 15 percent between 1980 and 1986 at the wholesale
level. MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 67.
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choice and value for money than that offered in foreign countries. 42
In short, when viewed in comparison with the market conditions
prevailing in foreign countries, the British market fares quite favor-
ably.
Both the MMC and Lord Young maintain that they have carefully
considered the requirements of EC law, particularly Regulation
1984/83, in formulating their respective recommendations.' 43 The
MMC Report concedes that the tenancy agreements submitted to
them for inspection by the brewers generally conformed with Reg-
ulation 1984/83.'" The same was also true of the loan tie agreements
submitted for inspection. 45 Clearly, these vertical agreements are
covered by the beer supply block exemption of 1984/83.1' The
MMC, however, believed that at least some of the enumerated
public interest detriments fell within the terms of Article 14 of
Regulation 1984/83 and were inconsistent with Article 85(3) of the
Treaty. 47 Both the MMC and Lord Young evidently believed that
their respective recommendations would remedy the detriments and
thus rectify the perceived conflict with EC rules.
Although the MMC recommendations are, on the surface, more
far-reaching than the compromise plan, the overall effect on com-
petition in the beer trade will likely differ little between the two.
Both will dramatically increase the number of free houses: indepen-
dents under the MMC plan and tied free houses under the compromise
plan. Consumer choice would increase with the addition of 22,000
new independent pubs under the MMC plan, and also with the
addition of some 11,000 free houses under the compromise plan.'4
The overall effect, however, will be minimal considering the wide
142 MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 433-36. Among the major findings of a study
of British and foreign travellers' perceptions of British pubs and foreign bars con-
ducted by Nielsen Consumer Research on behalf of the Brewer's Society are the
following: 1) All groups preferred British pubs to foreign bars; 2) Most of the
Britons and foreigners felt British pubs offered greater value for the money than
foreign bars; 3) Foreign bars, however, were seen as cheaper for drinks than British
pubs; 4) British pubs were perceived as better for draught beer range, atmosphere,
comfort, and friendliness. The MMC, however, considered the study to be far from
perfect.
141 Id. at 284; Young Statement, supra note 21.
I" MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23.
141 Id. at 26.
'4 Regulation 1984/83, supra note 66.
", MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 286.
" Id. at 5; Young Statement, supra note 21.
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range of beers already available in pubs, especially those of the
national brewers. 149
In the long-term, competition may improve to approximately the
same extent under either plan. Depending on the outcome of Lord
Young's proposed review of the licensing system, as many new in-
dependent pubs may be produced in the long-term under the Young
plan as would be created as a result of the divestment recommendation
of the MMC Report.
C. The European Community's Response to Brewery Tying
Agreements
The European Commission has recognized that while tying agree-
ments are inherently anti-competitive, since they tend to close off
markets to outsiders, they also provide benefits. 50 The inherent ten-
sion is reflected in Article 85 of the Treaty, Regulation 1984/83,
various Community decisions and notices, and the decisions of the
European Court of Justice.
The conflict is explicitly reflected in Article 85 which prohibits
exclusive dealing agreements in paragraph (1) and yet grants an
exemption in paragraph (3) where accrued benefits may be shown. 5'
The tension is further reflected by the special block exemption pro-
visions for beer agreements in Regulation 1984/83.152
The European Court of Justice has yet to confront fully the issue
of brewery tying agreements. One reason is that the Court has never
had to rule directly on the validity of a brewery tying agreement
under Article 85(3) since the two brewery agreement cases that have
come to the Court have arrived by way of requests for preliminary
rulings under Article 177.1'" Although the effect of de Haecht and
,49 See MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 460; Origin Universal News Services, supra
note 46.
,SO Question 1764/82, supra note 60, at 23-24.
Regulation 1984/83, supra note 66.
2 EEC Treaty, supra note 33, at art. 85.
, D.G. GOYDER, EEC COMPETnTON LAW 210 (1988) [hereinafter GOYDER]. The
two cases were Concordia, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 65, 19 Comm. MKT. L.R.
at 378, and S.A. Brasserile de Haecht, 1967 E. Comm. Ct. Rep. at 407, 7 COMM.
MKT. L.R. at 26.
Because Community law confers individual rights on Community nationals, it may
be invoked by individuals in national courts. Preliminary rulings are intended to
avoid differing and conflicting interpretations by national courts. There are two
types of preliminary rulings: rulings on interpretation and rulings on the validity of
Community acts. National lower courts may request a preliminary ruling. The
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Concordia was to permit Regulation 67/67 to encompass national
tying agreements where the cumulative effects restricted interstate
trade, the general view of the Court appears to have been that such
agreements in the brewing sector were to be expected and not to be
automatically considered violations of Article 85(1).' 4 In fact, the
Court has yet to find, based on the facts before it, that a brewery
tie violates Article 85(1). 155
With regard to enforcement, the Commission has been none too
consistent. In the view of the Commission, the fundamental objectives
of its competition policy is first and foremost to create an open and
integrated common market; secondly, to ensure the correct amount
of competition to meet the Treaty's aims; and thirdly, to protect the
consumer. 56 Likewise, the underlying premise of block exemptions
is to permit restrictive agreements where they improve distribution
and provide other benefits so long as they do not isolate markets
and prevent parallel imports."17 Furthermore, the stated purpose
behind the adoption of Regulation 1984/83 was to overcome the
inadequacies of Regulation 67/67 which had made it difficult to
control national brewery agreements. 58 Indeed, the aim of Regulation
1984/83 was to enable the Commission "to gradually abolish restric-
tive practices which affect intra-community trade in beer and other
beverages, to prevent distortion of competition and to increase con-
sumer choice." 9 The Commission is prepared to countenance re-
European Court may only give a ruling on Community law, not national law.
Opinions differ on the authority of preliminary rulings on interpretation. However,
it is generally accepted that: 1) the ruling is binding as to the requesting court or
other court of the Member State in which the case is to be decided; 2) it serves as
a basis for applying the relevant law in subsequent cases; and 3) the court may
always ask the European Court for another interpretation.
Preliminary rulings on the validity of Community acts, however, are universally
binding on all courts of Member States. The preliminary ruling procedure accounts
for most of the cases reaching the European Court. OFFICE FOR OFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNrrTEs, THn COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUmY 22-25 (4th ed. 1986).
5 GOYDER, supra note 153, at 210.
M55 C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 278 (3d ed.
1987) [hereinafter BELLAMY].
156 V. Korah, EEC Competition Policy - Legal Form or Economic Efficiency, 39
CURRENT LEGAL. PROBLEMS 85, 91 (R. Rideout & J. Jowell eds. 1986) [hereinafter
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS].
,J' 3. AGNEW, COMPETITION LAW 157 (1985).
158 Question No. 1764/82, supra note 60, at 23.
1,9 European Parliamentary Question No. 2326/82, 26 O.J. EUR. ComM. (No. C
266) 4, 5 (1983) (response by Mr. Andriesen on behalf of the European Commission).
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strictive beer agreements, at least in the short term, so long as they
do not completely destroy competition and the resulting benefits are
extended to the consumer.
Some of the Commission's positions, however, have belied its
commitment to the goal of abolishing restrictive practices which affect
intra-community trade in beer. In Concordia, the Commission pro-
posed that the Court draw a distinction between major and minor
contributions to the cumulative restrictive effect of national brewery
agreements on intra-community trade, suggesting that only major
contributions fall within the grasp of Article 85(l).'6 The Court
rejected this relative contribution proposal.' 6' However, the fact that
the Commission was seriously considering the adoption of a special
provision for small and medium size breweries and drink wholesalers,
up to the period immediately preceding the adoption of Regulation
1984/83, makes it apparent that the minor/major contribution dis-
tinction was not of a purely transitory interest to the Commission."6
The positions taken by the Commission suggest that it is inclined
to have a permissive attitude towards the implementation of its fun-
damental objectives of an open and integrated common market and
towards the abolition of restrictive practices which affect intra-com-
munity trade in beer. However, the Commission's actions may also
be seen as an indication of the Commission's predilection to punish
only the major players in the industry.
Like the Court, the Commission has yet to deny an exemption or
to find a brewery tying agreement to violate Article 85(1).163 Prior
to the adoption of Regulation 1984/83, this might have been explained
by the Commission's narrow interpretation of Regulation 67/67 as
inapplicable to national brewery agreements. 164 However, since the
,60 Concordia, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 70, 19 CoMM.. MKT. L.R. at 391.
The Advocate General asserted that the correct inquiry was "whether the market
is, in fact, open or closed and whether the situation represents the combined result
of all the impediments, both great and small, considered as a whole."
16, The distinction was explicitly rejected by the Advocate General. Id. Although
the Court's judgment did not explicitly refer to the distinction, the general import
of the judgment indicated substantial agreement with the Advocate General's opinion.
Id. at 80, 19 CoMM. MKT. L.R. at 401-06.
- Question No. 1764/82, supra note 60, at 24.
,61 BELJ.Amy, supra note 155, at 278.
,64 Question No. 1764/82, supra note 60, at 23. The Commission's narrow inter-
pretation of Regulation 67/67 is reflected in its decision in Goodyear Italiana-Euram,
18 O.J. EuR. Com. (No. L 38) 10, 12 (1975) where the Commission held that
Regulation 67/67 was not applicable to the exclusive dealing agreement which is
confined to activities within a Member State and which is only concerned with resale
of goods within the Member State.
[Vol. 20:583
BRITAIN'S TIED-HOUSE SYSTEM
adoption of Regulation 1984/83, the Commission has continued to
approve tying agreements. In the Carlsberg decision, the Commission
held that an agreement between Carlsberg brewery of Denmark and
Grand Metropolitan of Britain, whereby the latter was given exclusive
rights to produce, market, and sell Carlsberg beer in the United
Kingdom in exchange for royalty payments, was eligible for an ex-
emption because the benefits to be derived therefrom outweighed the
detriments. 65 Emphasizing the peculiar nature of the British beer
market, the Commission held that the agreement deserved an ex-
emption because otherwise it was unlikely that Carlsberg would be
able to penetrate the United Kingdom's market as quickly and as
easily without access to Grand Metropolitan's network of tied out-
lets. 166
Similarly, in July 1989, the Commission published a notice stating
its intention not to proceed against an agreement between Moosehead
Breweries of Canada and Whitbread of Britain in which Whitbread
was granted the exclusive right to produce, market, and sell Moose-
head beer in exchange for royalty payments.' 67 As in the Carlsberg
decision, the determining factor behind the approval was the nature
of the British market which makes it essential that a foreign brewer
wishing to enter the market gain the assistance of a large national
brewery.'6
Moreover, in November 1988, the Commission announced its in-
tention to approve the standard form tenancy agreement submitted
by Bass breweries for approval. 69 The agreement, containing a typical
tying clause whereby the tenant would obligate itself to purchase beer
from Bass exclusively in return for certain benefits, was held to
conform to the requirements of Regulation 1984/83.170
The Commission's apparent aversion to finding exclusive purchase
agreements illegal appears to be restricted to the beer industry. In
other areas of trade, such agreements have routinely been held to
16, 27 O.J. EUR. Com. (No. L 207) 26 (1984) [hereinafter Carlsberg decision].
'6 Id. at 34.
167 32 O.J. EuR. Com. (No. C 179) 13, 14 (1989) [hereinafter Moosehead decision].
The licensing agreement notified to the Commission in June 1988 has since obtained
the Commission's formal approval. Distribution Agreement in Beer Sector Gains
Article 85(3) Exemption from EC, 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
11469, at 892 (June 1990).
168 Id.
- 31 O.J. EuR. Com. (No. C 285) 5 (1988).
,7o Id. at 8.
1990]
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
infringe upon Article 85(1). Indeed, though it has the exclusive power
to grant exemptions, it has granted few-no more than three a year
prior to 1983, and only slightly more since then. 7'
One such instance was the Spices decision, in which the Commission
held that an exclusive purchase agreement between Brook Bond Lie-
big, a spice producer holding 39 percent of the Belgian market, and
the three largest supermarket chains, constituting 30 percent of the
retail spice market, whereby the latter obligated itself to sell only
Liebig spices apart from its own brands, constituted a violation of
Article 85(l).172 The Commission held that though Liebig and the
supermarkets benefitted from the arrangement, an 85(3) exemption
could not be granted because the benefits did not accrue to the
consumers since the agreement tended to reduce their choice and
resulted in higher prices. 73
The decision is also of interest since it was announced in 1977
when Regulation 67/67 was in force, illustrating that exclusive pur-
chase agreements could be found illegal even though restricted to a
single national market. 174 In addition, the fact that an agreement
largely identical in its essential aspects to a brewery tying agreement
was found to violate Article 85(1) indicates the special deference the
Commission grants to breweries.
The existence of an entrenched and long-established system of tied-
houses in much of the Community is also an important factor un-
derlying Commission policy on brewery agreements. 175 In formulating
Regulation 1984/83, the Commission was made aware of the sub-
stantial opposition that would arise in certain countries to prevent
any substantial interference in the adoption of the special block
exemption for beer agreements. 76 This recognition is reflected in the
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 156, at 95.
72 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 53) 20, 22-23 (1978) [hereinafter Spices decision].
Id. at 25.
'17 The case concerned an exclusive purchase agreement for the distribution and
sale of spices through supermarkets in Belgium. Spices decision, supra note 172, at
22.
17 The degree of compartmentalization varies but it is substantial in most Member
States. According to Commission estimates, in 1983 between 50 percent and 60
percent of publicans were tied to breweries in West Germany, France, and the
Benelux countries, and 80 percent in Britain. Tied houses were of only minor economic
importance in other Member States. The Commission also estimated that about
250,000 exclusive purchase agreements were in existence in the Community in 1983.
Question No. 1764/82, supra note 60, at 23.
176 GOYDER, supra note 153, at 210.
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use of tying agreements.'7 The recognition of the economic impor-
tance of the tied-house system was crucial to the Commission's ap-
proval of the tying agreements in the Carlsberg and Moosehead
decisions . 7  No doubt the Commission took note of the political
strength the tied-house system recently exhibited in forcing the British
government to retreat from the MMC's major recommendations.
V. CONCLUSION
On the surface, change is likely to be more spectacular and far-
reaching under the MMC's recommendations than under the Young
plan, at least in the short-term, since twice as many free houses are
projected to arise from under the MMC's proposals than under the
government's plan. The overall effect on the consumer's choice,
however, will be minimal considering the wide choices already avail-
able to him or her in British pubs. Assuming a liberal review of the
licensing system proposed by Lord Young occurs, as many inde-
pendent pubs may arise in the long-term under the Young plan as
under the MMC's. Thus, in the long-term, improvements in com-
petition may be roughly equivalent under either plan.
The European Commission asserts that its primary competition
objective is the abolition of restrictive practices and the attainment
of an open and integrated common market. Press reports strongly
indicate that the outcome of the Commission's investigation will be
more far-reaching and radical than either the MMC's or Lord Young's
plan. However, the Commission has in the past indicated its will-
ingness to condone at least minor violations. In marked contrast to
its apparent aversion to grant exemptions for exclusive purchase
agreements in other areas of trade, the Commission has yet to hold
a brewery tying agreement ineligible for an exemption.
Any prediction on the outcome of the current Commission inves-
tigation of the tied-house system would be highly speculative at best.
No adverse rulings on point, either by the European Court of Justice
or the Commission, have been handed down to justify such a pre-
diction. Whether either plan will satisfy the European Commission
17 The only other specific provision granting a block exemption for exclusive
purchase agreements in Regulation 1984/83 is for service-station agreements. The
provision is covered in Title III, Articles 10-17. Regulation 1984/83, supra note 66,
at 10-11.
178 See Carlsberg decision, supra note 165 and Moosehead decision, supra note
167.
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is impossible to say. However, based on past practices, an affirmative
answer is the more likely outcome. The tied-house system is by its
very nature restrictive of competition to some extent. Community
law accepts this as a given but nonetheless recognizes that there are
also benefits to be derived from the system. 179 Consequently, the
Commission's review will probably revolve around the balancing of
the anti-competitive nature of the system with the benefits to be
derived therefrom.
Notwithstanding the conclusions of the MMC Report, the evidence
suggests that despite the dominance of the United Kingdom market
by the big six and the competition restraints imposed by the tied-
house system upon which it rests, the United Kingdom's beer market:
is relatively competitive in comparison with comparable industrial
beer consuming countries, especially vis-a-vis open systems such as
Australia and the United States; is comparatively fragmented; provides
reasonable service, prices, and choice of beers; provides considerable
benefits to small regional, local, and specialty brewers; and has
generally satisfied British consumer desires. In short, there is little
imperative for a radical overhaul of the tied-house system.
Even absent the government reforms, social trends and market
forces, together with liberal licensing reforms, should alone have been
sufficient to accomplish the objectives of the MMC. The trend towards
lager beer, the demand for which is substantially met by foreign
brewers' 0s either through direct sales or through licensing agreements,
will inevitably challenge the dominance of the big six. Similarly, the
spectacular growth of restricted on-license premises such as hotels
and restaurants, coupled with the relatively anemic growth of full
on-licenses, has and will continue to decrease the market share of
the tied-house sector vis-A-vis the independent sector.' 8' The same will
likely result from the substantial growth in off-licenses during the
last quarter century. Furthermore, reform of the unduly restrictive
licensing system, coupled with a pro-independent sector bias and a
pro-competition application of those rules could, in conjunction with
the natural attrition of pubs by the big six, substantially meet the
major concerns of the MMC.
',9 The MMC Report concedes as much. MMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 284.
,so Foreign brewers account for approximately 36 percent of United Kingdom lager
sales, which constitute 18 percent of all beer sales. Rawstorne, A Change of Pace
to Restructuring, Financial Times, Sept. 19, 1990, at 17, col. 3.
"I See supra note 99.
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Finally, the advent of 1992 and the creation of a single European
market diminishes the relevance and importance of the national mar-
ket. Competition among brewers will increasingly take place on a
Community-wide scale and competition policy and rules will have to
adapt to this new emerging reality. The growth of European and
international brands is inevitable; in such circumstances, consolidation
among brewers in order to achieve economies of scale necessary to
compete on the European and international level is also inevitable. 18 2
In short, market concentration will increasingly be a matter of Com-
munity, and not national, evaluation.
Postscript
On June 14, 1990, after fifteen months of investigation, European
Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan announced the comple-
tion of the Community beer market. The main conclusions were: 1)
no general changes were required to Community rules governing
agreements between brewers and their retail outlets; 2) the Commission
may evaluate whether further measures are required in the United
Kingdom's market once the newly implemented government reforms
have had time to take effect; 3) exclusive purchase agreements for
small regional brewers should be governed by national law, and not
Community rules; and 4) licensing agreements between the major
brewers will be examined to determine whether they are being used
to divide markets or control imports. 83
The review noted that countries operating a tied-house system,
including Germany, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, were serviced
by a "proliferation of small and medium-sized breweries" and offered
their consumers the most choices.'" In contrast, countries with fully
open systems, such as Denmark, Ireland, Australia, and the United
States, are dominated by one or two breweries benefitting from
economies of scale. 185 Although it found the beer markets in the
reviewed countries 86 to be static, the Commission found insufficient
1 Rawstorne, supra note 180, at 17.
,83 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1472, at 1024 (June 28, 1990).
184 Id.
19, Id. For example, Denmark is dominated by Carlsberg, Ireland by Guiness, the
United States by Anheuser Bush and Miller, and Australia by Bond and Elders. Id.
I" The countries reviewed by the Commission included the United Kingdom, West
Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
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evidence to either conclude that the tied-house system was to blame
or to justify any major changes to Regulation 1984/83 governing
tying agreements between brewers and their outlets.' 87
Although the Commission singled out the United Kingdom for
possible further action, it has decided to delay any further evaluation
until after the government reforms have been fully implemented and
have had time to take full effect. 88 Concerned by the uniquely
pervasive nature of the United Kingdom's tied-house system, which
it found to be aggravated by the restrictive licensing system that limits
the number of new retailers, 1 9 the Commission has decreed that the
proportion of beer sales passing through tied-houses be reduced from
the current 62 percent level to the maximum European level of 40
percent. 9° The reduction in tied-house sales should occur naturally
as the national brewers free the approximately 10,000 outlets from
the tie in conformance with the government reforms.''
The most significant substantive change is the Commission's de-
cision to exempt small brewers from the EC rules on exclusive pur-
chase agreements and to leave such agreements to control by national
laws. This change is consistent with the de minimis rule and with
Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings' 92 and the new looming realities of a single European
market.
Potentially more significant is the Commission's decision to closely
scrutinize licensing agreements between major brewers to determine
whether they are being used to divide markets or control imports.
The number of licensing agreements by major brewers is on the
increase.' 93 Although the Commission accepts that "[miany such
agreements benefit consumers by enabling a small specialist brewer
to make its product available outside its home market, or by acting
as a stepping stone for the full, independent entry of a large mul-
187 Id.
In Since the three-year implementation period of the reforms does not expire until
October 1990, in all practicality, no further evaluation will take place until 1993 at
the earliest.
219 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1472, at 1024 (June 28, 1990).
I" The Independent, June 15, 1990, at 23.
'' Id.
,92 See Regulation 4064/84, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) (1989), supra note
107. The Commission presently is evaluating the level at which this de minimis
exception should take place. 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1472, at
1024 (June 28, 1990).
191 58 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1472, at 1024 (June 28, 1990).
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tinational brewer into other geographical areas," it is concerned that
they "can also serve as vehicles for market-sharing, enabling large
breweries to control imports in order to ossify existing market struc-
tures . . .
The Commission also found that few European brewers had a
significant presence outside their home markets. 95 The Commission
also discovered evidence of increasing internationalism among major
European brewers, noting, however, that they remain relatively small
on an international level and lack the economies of scale enjoyed by
the United States and Japanese "mega-breweries.' " In light of these
observations, the consistent approval of brewer licensing agreements
by the Commission, and the emergence of a single European market,
the Commission is unlikely to, nor should it, deny approval absent
clear and convincing evidence of anti-competitive motives and illegal
collusive conduct designed to restrain Community trade.
Significant recent developments have also occurred in the United
Kingdom's beer market in response to the implementation of the
MMC-inspired reforms. Among the big six, Scottish & Newcastle,
closest to the 2000 tied-house limit when it was announced, has already
reduced its 2300 pubs to below the 2000 ceiling.' 97 Whitbread, with
6250 pubs is replacing its tenancies with leases and will convert the
surplus into free houses. Allied-Lyons is similarly converting tenancies
into leases. 9
Grand Metropolitan and Courage have proposed a radical and
innovative solution: a pubs-for-breweries swap. Under the original
proposal, Grand Metropolitan would sell its breweries to Courage,
controlled by Elders of Australia; a fifty-fifty joint venture, to be
called Entrepreneur Estates Ltd. (IEL), would be created between
Grand Metropolitan and Courage with some 7000 pubs-composed of
Courage pubs and all but 1700 of Grand Metropolitan's over 5000
pubs; IEL would be tied to Courage by a renewable ten-year exclusive
purchase agreement; and the joint venture would be managed on a
day-to-day basis by Grand Metropolitan.199
194 Id.
,9' Id. The Commission observed that "[oinly approximately [4%] of all beer
consumed in the EC has crossed a national border-this is a reflection not only of
significantly different demand patterns in Member States but also the high unit costs
involved in transporting beer." Id.
196 Id.
97 The Daily Telegraph, Oct. 24, 1990, at 35.
198 Id.
199 The Times (London), Aug. 21, 1990, at 23, col. 1.
1990]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
In October 1990, the MMC rejected the proposal as submitted and
proposed amendments to the deal which would have to be accepted
before its approval would be forthcoming. The recommendations are:
that the merged brewing interests of Courage be reduced from 20
percent to no more than 15 percent of the United Kingdom's beer
market; that the period of the exclusive purchase agreement be reduced
to five years; that the proportion of full on-licensed premises tied to
Courage in any Petty Sessional division be reduced to 25 percent;
and that Courage take measures to ensure that it does not control
its 50 percent voting rights in IEL in order to avoid the pressure
being exerted on IEL tenants to show preference for Courage beer."
Indications suggest that the recommendations will be accepted and
the pubs-for-breweries deal will gain final approval. 2°1 The European
Commission, which has been studying the proposed pubs-for-brew-
eries deal and reserves the right to open its own formal investigation, 2
has been able to exert its influence on the pub swap negotiations20
and can thus be expected to approve the deal should it be accepted
by the British government.
There is presently some expectation that Bass, the market leader
with over 7000 public houses, will sell in order to meet the 2000
ceiling. 204 However, should the Grand Metropolitan/Courage pubs-
for-breweries deal gain final approval, it is likely that Bass will devise
a similarly innovative scheme in order to avoid the full impact of
the Tied Estate Order.
These recent developments bear out the predictions that the reforms
would have, as their inevitable consequence, the effect of forcing the
national brewers to choose between brewing or retailing, with the
concomitant result that the system of large-scale vertical integration
would give way to a system of horizontal integration and consolidation
in the separate areas of brewing and retailing. 20 5 The immediate result
of the pubs-for-breweries swap deal is the creation of one mega-size
retailing group and a reduction from six to five national breweries
The Times (London), Oct. 17, 1990, at 25, col. 2.
Id. Negotiations between the brewers and Sir Gordan Borrie, the Director
General of the Office of Fair Trading, to rework the scheme are currently underway
and due to be completed by November 16. Id.
= Id.
2o U.K. Commission Will Investigate Pubs-For-Breweries Transanction, 58 An-
titrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1464, at 685 (May 3, 1990).
The Daily Telegraph, Oct. 24, 1990, at 35.
1 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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in control of the United Kingdom beer market. This can hardly have
been the result intended by the authors of the MMC Report. This
consequence illustrates the frequent folly of those in charge of com-
petition policy to concentrate on the theoretical constructs of a com-
petitive market model rather than on the practical and actual effects
of economic activities and arrangements on the economy. Sometimes
the wisest course is to respect the old adage-if it ain't broke, don't
fix it.
David A. Everreste

